The “Gainful Employment Rule” and Student Loan Defaults: How the Policy Frame Overlooks Important Normative Implications by Serna, Gabriel
Journal of Student Financial Aid
Volume 44 | Issue 1 Article 5
7-25-2014
The “Gainful Employment Rule” and Student Loan
Defaults: How the Policy Frame Overlooks
Important Normative Implications
Gabriel Serna
University of Northern Colorado, sernagab@msu.edu
Follow this and additional works at: https://ir.library.louisville.edu/jsfa
Part of the Higher Education Administration Commons
This Issue Article is brought to you for free and open access by ThinkIR: The University of Louisville's Institutional Repository. It has been accepted for
inclusion in Journal of Student Financial Aid by an authorized administrator of ThinkIR: The University of Louisville's Institutional Repository. For
more information, please contact thinkir@louisville.edu.
Recommended Citation
Serna, Gabriel (2014) "The “Gainful Employment Rule” and Student Loan Defaults: How the Policy Frame Overlooks Important
Normative Implications," Journal of Student Financial Aid: Vol. 44 : Iss. 1 , Article 5.
Available at: https://ir.library.louisville.edu/jsfa/vol44/iss1/5
National Association of  Student Financial Aid Administrators 69
The “Gainful Employment Rule” and Student Loan Defaults:
How the Policy Frame Overlooks Important Normative
Implications
By Gabriel Serna
This essay examines normative aspects of the gainful employment
rule and how the policy frame and image miss important implica-
tions for student aid policy. Because the economic and social burdens
associated with the policy are typically borne by certain socio-
economic and ethnic groups, the policy frame and image do not
identify possible negative connotations associated with higher levels
of student loan default and debt-burden. This essay argues that little
attention has been paid to the normative associations surrounding
this policy and the ways that the framing of the issues creates a
specific image for policymakers and the tax-paying public.
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For-profit higher education institutions have been a part of  theAmerican higher education landscape for at least the past century,though their presence has only truly been felt for roughly the past
twenty years (Bennett, Luchesi, & Vedder, 2010; Breneman, Pusser, &
Turner, 2006; Kinser, 2007; Millora, 2010; Ruch, 2001; Tierney &
Hentschke, 2007). This increased presence has also resulted in increased
attention to the admissions, recruitment, and financial aid practices of  such
institutions. One need only look to recent articles in The Chronicle of  Higher
Education and Inside Higher Ed to understand the scrutiny these institutions
face regarding federal student loan defaults, questionable financial aid
practices, and promises of  gainful employment (Blumenstyk, 2011a, b;
Fain, 2014; Field, 2010, 2011, 2014). Prior to the gainful employment rule’s
implementation, concerns were raised by the U.S. Government Account-
ability Office (GAO, 2011a, b) and its director Gregory Kutz (2011).
Similarly, multiple individuals- including, David Hawkins (2011), Director
of  Public Policy and Research for the Association for College Admission
Counseling; Dr. Michale McComis (2011), Executive Director for the
Accrediting Commission for Career Schools and Colleges; Robert
Shireman (2011), Deputy Undersecretary for the U.S. Department of
Education; and Mary Mitchelson (2011), Acting Inspector General for the
U.S. Department of  Education- were called before the Senate Committee
on Health, Education, Labor, and Pensions to provide testimony. Based on
these hearings, the Department of  Education enacted regulations under
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the heading “gainful employment” in 2011 that would define gainful
employment and effectively limit the amount of  debt students enrolled in
for-profit educational institutions or vocational programs could incur
based on a set of  measures established by the US Department of  Educa-
tion (ED) (NACUBO, 2011; ED, 2011).
Though ED implemented the rules in July 2011, challenges to the new
regulations were soon brought in federal court. In mid-2012 “gainful
employment” regulations as implemented were found to be arbitrary in
their chosen metrics. While the ruling delayed the implementation of  the
policy, it also made explicit the notion that ED had authority to define and
monitor gainful employment measures and outcomes. This led the Obama
administration to announce new steps to combat concerns about student
loan debt levels and default through updated regulations decidedly focused
on the for-profit sector (ED, 2014; Fain, 2014; Field, 2014). Based on the
most recent version of  the regulations, two primary debt-to-income
measures tests are to be employed and cohort rates rather than total
default rates will be used to determine eligibility for participation in federal
aid programs.
Given the great deal of  attention focused on loan default rates and debt
incurred by students at for-profit institutions, it is important to understand
how the policy frame misses some rather important normative concerns.
Therefore, in this essay I examine the empirical considerations and norma-
tive aspects that the gainful employment rule engenders and how the policy
frame and image1, while useful, misses important implications for student
aid policy2. Because the economic and social burdens associated with the
policy are typically borne by certain socio-economic and ethnic groups, the
policy frame and its image do little to identify possible negative connota-
tions of  certain groups that are associated with higher levels of  student
loan default and debt-burden based on the research literature. This essay
argues that little attention has been paid to the normative associations
surrounding this policy and the ways in which the framing of  the issues
creates a specific image for policymakers and the tax-paying public.
 In addition to the preceding, this essay will consider how empirical and
economic considerations have taken center stage in the process of  defining
the policy’s image and the negative consequences associated with it. For
example, Karen Gross (2014) and Jacob Gross & Nicholas Hillman (2014)
all note that current metrics are seriously flawed and miss many important
contextual factors. This is not to suggest that analyzing student aid policy
in a quantitative manner is itself  un-useful; in fact, doing so provides
fruitful results and information. The goal of  this analysis is instead to draw
out the importance of  the inclusion of  normative implications that this
policy engenders but which up to now have been largely omitted from the
policy debate. Moreover, I am not suggesting that the normative implica-
tions considered here are specific to the gainful employment rule, but
rather that this type of  policy framing may be problematic on the whole
and could extend to other areas of  higher education policy. Perhaps by
understanding the normative implications of  this specific policy it may
become clearer how policy formulation and implementation in higher
education can benefit from including normative concerns more directly.
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In reaction to concerns from the Government Accountability Office
(GAO, 2011a), Congress, and the tax-paying public, the U.S. Department
of  Education proposed a policy rule entitled “gainful employment” in July
of  2010. The policy was aimed at more clearly defining “gainful” college
education with regard to employment. It also generated debt restrictions to
stem what was considered to be excessive loan burden accumulated by
students at for-profit higher education institutions. While the policy also
applied to occupational training at more traditional public and private
institutions, the rhetoric and politics surrounding the policy issue were and
remain decidedly focused on for-profit educational institutions. Another
important consideration is that these institutions tend to enroll higher
proportions of  students from socio-economically disadvantaged3 back-
grounds and underrepresented groups4 (Bennett, Luchesi, & Vedder, 2010;
Field, 2010, 2011; GAO, 2011a,b; Kutz, 2011). The policy as initially
proposed sought to limit student loan debt by subjecting gainful employ-
ment programs to a three-measure test of  program graduate data. In the
most recent iteration of  the regulations these measures have changed and
are now based on two primary metrics that are to be discussed as part of
the rulemaking session to take place in 2014 (ED, 2014). To be clear, debt
measures included in the policy are aimed at programs on the whole, so as
a result individual students may have ratios that exceed the thresholds
outlined in the policy while the institution can still meet overall compliance
requirements, if  aggregate ratios remain within thresholds (NACUBO,
2011; ED, 2011).
Programs must meet at least one of  the measures to pass the gainful
employment rule threshold for compliance. In other words, the program
meets with compliance measures if  it can show that the annual debt-to-
discretionary income of  a program’s typical graduate is not more than
30%, or that a program’s graduates’ debt-to-total earnings ratio is less than
12% on average. If  an institution fails on both income measures twice in a
three-year period, they would not qualify to participate in federal aid
programs (Field, 2014). Therefore, although expressed as a two-measure
rule, a program must meet only one of  these measures to remain in
compliance (NACBUO, 2011; ED, 2011). For those programs below the
thresholds but within a certain zone on debt-to-income measures of  8-
12% or 20-30% for cohort default rates, new regulations would be
adopted. In this case institutions would not be allowed to remain in these
“zones” for more than four consecutive years or they would become
ineligible to participate in Title IV programs. Also, as long as the program
is within these zones it must warn students that they may not be eligible
for future aid (ED, 2014; Fain, 2014; Field, 2014).
These thresholds are intended to provide information for prospective
students and to serve as an early warning system. The goal of  this warning
system is two-fold. First, it is intended to provide more information for
students in order for them to make the best choices between programs
with differing levels of  risk regarding their ability to obtain federal funds.
Second, it is intended to allow students to differentiate between programs
that still have sufficient time to make required changes to meet the thresh-
olds and those programs in imminent danger of  losing federal funding
(ED, 2014). Gross (2014) states that as far as defaults are concerned,
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reported averages may not provide enough information for student
decision-making. This is a significant limitation of  this early warning
system.
The empirical literature regarding default rates among students from for-
profit colleges indicates that for-profit school students account for a
disproportionate share of  student loan defaults (Bennett, Luchesi, &
Vedder, 2010; Blumenstyk, 2011 a, b; GAO, 2011b; Hentschke, Lechuga, &
Tierney, 2010; Hentschke, 2010; Kutz, 2011; Ruch, 2001; Scanlon &
McComis, 2010; Tierney & Hentschke, 2007). The same literature also
shows that these students tend to have larger debt-burdens upon departure
or graduation and that the primary populations served by for-profit
educational institutions are from underrepresented and low-income
backgrounds (Deming, Goldin, & Katz, 2012). Furthermore, it is also clear
that students from low-income backgrounds, which tends to be correlated
with status as an underrepresented minority, are also more likely to default
on student loans in general (Bennett, Luchesi, & Vedder, 2010; Field, 2010,
2011; GAO, 2011b; Gross, Cekic, Hossler, & Hillman, 2009; Kinser, 2009;
Kutz, 2011; Millora, 2010; Tierney & Hentschke, 2007). The only empirical
evidence of  student loan-defaults within what was then considered an
acceptable range from students that have attended for-profit institutions
was presented by Ruch (2001). However, subsequent literature, as well as
recent reports by Blumenstyk (2011a, b), show that this is simply not the
case based upon the available data. The National Student Loan Data
System (2011) provides evidence that, as compared to public institutions,
both non-profit privates and for-profit institutions have much higher
default rates in their programs, with duration of  less than 2 years.
For example, using data from NSLDS, for the years 2007-2009, the
average default rates at public institution programs of  less than 2 years
were 8.03%, non-profit privates 13.73%, and for-profits 12.7% (see figures
on the next page). In this instance, one might ask why the same policy
attention and the rules governing program integrity in terms of  marketing,
recruitment, and admissions do not also apply to non-profit programs of
less than two years. Moving further along in the data, the average across
the same years for these institutions for programs at public institutions
with a duration of  2-3 years was 10.6%, non-profit privates 8.8%, and at
for-profits 13.3%. When one moves beyond 2-year programs the differ-
ences in defaults become more significant across institutional types with
for-profits at the top (see Figure 3). However, it is clear that in terms of
loan defaults, students at non-profit private and for-profit institutions in
programs with a duration of  less than 2 years at have higher default rates.
The reason for increased attention may be due to the overall default rates
associated with proprietary institutions instead of  program type. For
example, average default rates across the same three years for all programs
show that public institutions have a rate of  approximately 6.4%, non-profit
privates 4.1%, and for-profits 12.5%. In other words, it may be that the
legislation, although aimed in many ways at for-profit institutions, also aims
to limit defaults in vocational programs at all types of  institutions.
Literature
Review
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Source: National Student Loan Data System (2011) from http://www2.ed.gov/offices/
OSFAP/defaultmanagement/instrates.html
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 It is evident from the numerous studies cited above, and the data on
student loan defaults, that default rates are higher among students associ-
ated with specific student characteristics: attending a for-profit institution,
minority background, or low-income. It is also patently the case that for-
profit institutions provide a service to students whom may find it difficult,
if  not impossible, to access higher education otherwise. That is, for-profit
institutions serve an under-served demographic (Breneman, Pusser, &
Turner, 2006; Hentschke, 2010; Deming, Goldin, & Katz, 2012;
Hentschke, Lechuga, & Tierney, 2010). They provide access to higher
education for a population that might not otherwise obtain access, as
evidenced by for-profit institutions’ significant enrollments of
underrepresented and socio-economically disadvantaged students. The
reason that they do this could be related to at least three reasons.
First, these institutions often maintain admissions standards that fall on
the lower side of  the spectrum when compared to traditional non-profit
college and universities. Second, they typically employ a cadre of  specialists
that help students traverse the intricate institutional hierarchies related to
financing their education. Third, one simply needs to examine the often
significant role played by marketing in the for-profit sector. Marketing
efforts from many for-profit institutions has been shown to often target
vulnerable populations (Schade, 2014). This is why the policy image
matters so much in this case. As noted by Hossler (2004), most non-profit
institutions seek to balance revenue generation with class diversity and
prestige. Because these three goals can often work at cross-purposes,
traditional non-profit institutions are typically not equipped to help these
students navigate an often complex admissions and financial aid process.
Even community colleges have recognized the struggles associated with
providing needed support during the initial stages of  the enrollment
experience (Cooper, 2010).
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Moreover, the goal of  the gainful employment policy is to define gainful
employment and to limit debt burden by adopting a formula to determine
what ED considers appropriate based upon statistical analysis. However,
the final provisions adopted allow more time for institutions to comply and
lessens the number of  institutions that would have initially been rendered
ineligible under the preliminary proposal. This calls into question the true
motives behind this policy action. The regulations are aimed primarily at
the for-profit sector, thus implicitly framing the policy as a problem with
student defaults from this sector. Given these intricacies, it becomes
necessary to understand the normative implications such data and empiri-
cal findings suggest.
In the case of  student loans, students have come to bear a greater share
of  the costs associated with obtaining a degree. This has especially been
the case as state and federal governments have become more comfortable
with cost-sharing and the economic ideals of  derived private benefits
(Johnstone, 2004; Johnstone & Marcucci, 2010). In the event that a student
and his or her family is unfamiliar with the process of  attending and paying
for college, the goals of  program integrity and the policy rules overall
should consider both the economics of  the situation as well as the framing
of  the problem. In other words, socio-economically disadvantaged stu-
dents, who are often from underrepresented groups, may be more vulner-
able to misleading marketing or understatement of  the potential benefits
of  seeking a very expensive college degree, given their larger numbers at
for-profit institutions (Deming, Goldin, & Katz, 2012; GAO, 2011a). What
is more, the framing of  the policy as a “consumer protection” appears
double-edged. On the one hand, it aims to protect these students from
large or unsustainable debt-burden. On the other, it explicitly ignores the
characteristics and conditions that have largely contributed to the student
loan-default problem (ED, 2011) and the social justice issues that accom-
pany these circumstances. By ignoring characteristics correlated with higher
levels of  debt-burden and debt-default, ED has chosen a policy frame that
disproportionately focuses on a specific part of  the population—students
at for-profit institutions. In so doing, they have likely contributed to
implicit, but negative, connotations associated with students who attend
these institutions because of  the policy’s focus on loan-default regulations
aimed primarily at this higher education sector.
Student loan debt can quickly become unmanageable when students,
expecting a well-paying job after graduation, utilize debt to cover both
educational costs and other household expenditures (such as housing and
food) that accrue while the student is enrolled. Therefore, a reliance on
debt can become a vicious cycle for these individuals. Unlike students who
are wealthier or have access to greater social capital and family resources,
students from low-income backgrounds (which tend to be correlated with
underrepresented status) may have no other recourse but to borrow while
in college. Subsequently, these students may be more likely to default on
their debt if  its level is too high, they are under- or unemployed, or if  they
are simply unaware of  the numerous repayment options available to them
(K. Gross, 2014). Further, the much higher prices students face at for-
profit educational institutions may exacerbate this situation, as students are
Student Debt
and Default
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required to obtain more debt to cover these higher costs. Hence, the
probability of  default is already higher for underrepresented and low-
income students based on contextual factors omitted in the policy’s
framing (Bennett, Luchesi, & Vedder, 2010; Field, 2010, 2011; GAO,
2011b; Gross, Cekic, Hossler, & Hillman, 2009; Kinser, 2009; Kutz, 2011;
Millora, 2010; Tierney & Hentschke, 2007).
A larger problem lies in the sheer level of  debt incurred in the process as
well as the prospects for gainful employment, given the number of  pos-
sible obstacles facing many socio-economically disadvantaged students (see
Gross, Cekic, Hossler, & Hillman, 2009, for a full discussion). For example,
Deming, Goldin, & Katz (2012) utilize regression analysis to examine
default data spanning 2004-2009 across institutions, controlling for a
number of  institutional factors including demographic composition and
locality effects. Their findings show higher default rates than those calcu-
lated from NSLDS above using only three years of  data. Their results
indicate that for-profit default rates are 8.7 points higher than four-year
public and private non-profit institutions and 5.7 points higher than for
non-profit public community colleges. Moreover, Deming, Golden, & Katz
(2012) indicate that these institutions serve primarily underrepresented,
non-traditional, and socioeconomically disadvantaged students. The study
also provides evidence that students who attend and graduate from
programs at for-profit institutions often have much larger debt-burdens
upon exit, have higher levels of  loan-default, and after six years have higher
levels of  unemployment and lower pay relative to students at non-profit
institutions. The authors go on to highlight the fact that at least as far as
retention is concerned, at the certificate and associate degree levels, for-
profits do a good job of  keeping students enrolled and graduating them
from these programs. However, the study underscores the sentiment many
for-profit students shared regarding the quality and price of  their educa-
tion. In short, they were less satisfied and often did not feel their education
was worth the cost.
ED has essentially defined the gainful employment rule in terms of
financial metrics which bound methodological approaches (Dunn, 2012;
Guba, 1984) for understanding the policy’s impacts and the image it
creates. This approach and policy frame effectively limits and omits what
are considered important normative concerns regarding the populations
typically served by these types of  institutions. Further, this policy frame
arguably perpetuates negative images of  students (and by extension
borrowers) at these types of  institutions. For example, much of  the
language in the rule is aimed at defining gainful employment by
operationalizing the problem as an issue with “taxpayer burden” in terms
of  defaults. The gainful employment rule aims to protect students at for-
profit educational institutions from large or unsustainable debt-burden but
explicitly ignores many of  the characteristics and normative conditions that
the research literature has shown to impact student loan-default and debt-
burden (ED, 2011). Specifically, the policy frame also does not 1) take into
account individual circumstances because of  the policy’s focus on the
problem as an economic issue, 2) address what is likely stigmatization of
socio-economically disadvantaged and underrepresented students who are
The Gainful
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more likely to attend for-profit institutions, because the rules effectively
limit the policy primarily to this sector, and 3) consider how emphasis at
the institutional level may create completion barriers for students whose
institution has exceeded the established debt-measure limits. By creating a
policy that is broad enough that its stated purpose is consumer protection,
but omits any language related to the consumers it argues need protection,
the policy explicitly overlooks normative considerations. In fact, the
language in the final policy stated that although ED was asked to consider
socio-economic status and demographics, policymakers agreed that this
request was unwarranted. For example, under thresholds for debt measure-
ment ED (2011, para. 76, p. 34393) states:
The Department does not agree that the thresholds should be
adjusted to reflect the demographics or economic status of  the
students enrolled in gainful employment programs. Students are
not well served by enrolling in programs that leave them with
debts they cannot afford to repay, regardless of  their background.
Moreover, as illustrated in the Student Demographics section of
the RIA, there are institutions and programs achieving strong
results with students from disadvantaged backgrounds, and many
programs serving even the most disadvantaged students are
performing well under the debt measure.
On its face, the department’s assertion that students do not gain from
attending a program where they leave with unmanageable debt is true;
however, the statement does not consider the demographics or economic
status of  the groups who typically attend these institutions. Thus, gainful
employment is a broad-based policy that omits two very important reasons
correlated with attendance and departure of  individuals at these institu-
tions. First, it fails to consider the fact that students attending these
institutions may inherently have more difficulty repaying loans. Second,
these students tend leave with higher levels of  debt than their peers at
more traditional institutions because borrowing is often the only way they
can afford to access higher education at all. This notion is supported in a
literature review by Gross, Cekic, Hossler, & Hillman (2009) which indi-
cates that students from underrepresented backgrounds and/or who have
less resources or familial assistance tend to default on student loan repay-
ment at higher rates. This review highlights the findings of  a host of
studies, including: Boyd (1997), Gladieux & Perna (2005), Podgursky,
Ehlert, Monroe, Watson, & Wittstruck (2002), and Harrast (2004) (all cited
in Gross, Cekic, Hossler, & Hillman, 2009), which each provide evidence
that demographic and socioeconomic factors matter in terms of  student
debt.
By stating the policy’s goal primarily in terms of  economic consider-
ations and “taxpayer burden,” its normative implications are underscored.
Namely, that the role played by student characteristics and background is
ignored by this framing especially as related to the type of  institutions they
generally attend and for debt levels and repayment. Additionally, recent
reports in the Washington Post (de Vise, 2011) and Inside Higher Ed (Nelson,
2011) suggest that even the provisions that have been adopted nonetheless
miss their economic protections in the short-term; under pressure and
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intense criticism from the for-profit sector, the economic and “consumer
protections” the policy sought to implement were dampened in the final
adoption, which extended grace and implementation periods, weakened
thresholds, and lessened punitive actions (ED, 2011). Therefore, even the
consumer protections included in the final policy language were watered-
down to some extent.
The reaction of  the Department of  Education (ED) to the concerns
raised by the GAO, Congress, and the public have framed the nature of  the
proposal, as well as to define it as policy in the event of  its adoption. In
this case, ED defined the boundaries of  the policy proposal as a strategy to
fix an economic problem. It is likely that this definition of  the problem
was spurred by increasing attention from the media, scholars, and govern-
ment surrounding the disproportionate student-loan defaults from stu-
dents who had attended for-profit institutions. Moreover, the profit-motive
of  such institutions has in recent years been questioned, especially when
significant attention to student loan-default rates increased (Bennett,
Luchesi, & Vedder, 2010; Blumenstyk, 2011 a,b; GAO, 2011a; Hentschke,
Lechuga, & Tierney, 2010; Hentschke, 2010; Kutz, 2011; Ruch, 2001;
Scanlon & McComis, 2010; Tierney & Hentschke, 2007). Many policy-
makers feel that “profit” and “education” should not be included in the
same sentence, while others disagree, which likely played a role in the
framing of  the gainful employment policy. This perception of  the problem
has served to define the policy image and frame in a very specific way. In
other words, ideology probably played a more important role in framing
this policy in terms of  consumer protections given the emphasis on
taxpayer burden.
Baumgartner & Jones (1991, 1993) show that a policy’s image or frame
matters not only for whether or not it is adopted but where and how, as
well as the amount of  attention and possible revisions it may face. Addi-
tionally, Rosen (2009) restates the importance of  policy as both a rhetorical
and symbolic tool. Therefore, it could be argued that ED, by responding in
such a manner, has reacted to the problematic image that resulted from
increased concern with student-loan default rates by students both depart-
ing and graduating from for-profit institutions. It may also be the case that
the policy question and proposal were meant as a symbol to be taken as
evidence that the Department of  Education is addressing the issue.
However, in this same process little if  any attention was paid to the
normative implications surrounding this policy, its framing, and its image -
namely the fact that the economic concerns and social burden are decid-
edly borne by certain social and racial groups. While it is true that the
policy aims to “protect” these consumers, framing the policy in such a way
reifies what could be argued to be a tainted image that accompanies loan
defaults given the propensity of  underrepresented and socio-economically
disadvantaged students, statuses which are highly correlated with one
another, to attend such institutions.
While the policy addresses the problem of  deceptive marketing, recruit-
ment, and admissions practices that some for-profit higher education
institutions undertake to attract students, who subsequently borrow in
order to cover educational expenses, with the promise of  “gainful employ-
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ment” after graduation, it does so in a separate set of  program integrity
regulations (ED, 2011). However, this action limits the requirements to the
for-profit sector, whose students are primarily those who have not histori-
cally been represented in higher education.
Before analyzing the normative aspects of  the policy under consideration,
it is important to highlight a larger issue concerning normative analysis:
specifically, the frequent omission of  normative features embedded in
student aid policy analysis. This is in addition to the embedded nature of
these features in the formulation of  policy proposals in this domain. For
example, Birkland (2005) and Dunn (2012) highlight the necessary inter-
play between empirical evidence, both qualitative and quantitative, and
common societal values and interests. Birkland goes on to say that in many
instances, at least in American history, emotion and ideology have overrid-
den empirical evidence at different stages in the policy process. For ex-
ample, during the “food stamp debates” of  the 1980s and 1990s,
significant anecdotal evidence, which might have been more closely related
to ideological evangelism, was offered in defense of  “individual initiative
and limited government” (p. 9) in order to illustrate the policy’s shortcom-
ings. This example shows how important normative considerations are
when framing a debate. In the food stamp case, those who participated in
the program were inherently lacking in individual initiative based on the
policy’s framing and image. In the current political environment, where
much of  the same rhetoric and virtues are being extolled, this seems to be
the case as well. The normative implications of  the gainful employment
rule as currently framed suggest that default rates and debt levels are a
problem at for-profit institutions. The policy fails to recognize why
students from certain backgrounds might attend these institutions, why
they might be at higher risk for default, and how the non-profit sector
might better serve these individuals.
Turning to financial aid, student loan policy debates tend to be guided by
a rational and scientific approach of  analysis and evaluation.5 Financial aid
policy surrounding student loans and related defaults are no exception to
this trend. Policy questions are often framed in such a way that leads to
primary emphasis on quantitative data and methods, thus omitting what
could be critical qualitative data and/or normative considerations, as seems
to be the case in the current context. The concern is that studies of
student aid and student aid policies that fail to incorporate important
normative aspects in the formulation and implementation process, by
basing decisions mainly on quantitative analysis and financial metrics, may
omit important facets that affect public policy and conceptions of  social
justice. In other words, omission of  normative concerns affects the way in
which the policy is understood and, subsequently, how the public, govern-
ment, and students and families interpret the policy and its goals.
In the case of  the “gainful employment” rule, the policy has been framed
as an economic policy issue, at least on its face. The normative implications
of  the policy proposal, namely the stigma attached with debt-default and
the characteristics associated with higher levels of  debt and default,
received little if  any attention. The policy solution, adoption, and initial
Discussion
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proposal were framed as a response to employment and wages, larger debt-
burden, and high default rates of  students who attend for-profit institu-
tions. Of  second-order was that a vulnerable cross-section of  the
population was likely being exploited and that a certain stigma was possibly
being attributed to students who attended these institutions. As illustrated
in the Literature Review, the large amount of  research on the topic is not
ambiguous regarding who attends these institutions, who is most likely to
default, and who accrues the most debt (Bennett, Luchesi, & Vedder, 2010;
Field, 2010, 2011; Deming, Goldin, & Katz, 2012; GAO, 2011a,b; Gross,
Cekic, Hossler, & Hillman, 2009; Hinze-Pifer & Fry, 2010; Kinser, 2009;
Kutz, 2011; Millora, 2010; Tierney & Hentschke, 2007).
Nevertheless, the policy is defined in terms of  financial metrics associ-
ated with a social problem. For example, J. Gross and Hillman (2014)
indicate that public perception of  student loan debt and default can drive
how the policy is understood. Negative connotations and policy framing
surrounding student defaults and higher debt-burdens are associated with
for-profit institutions and the students they serve. This is done while
omitting the introduction of  some of  the important characteristics associ-
ated with default and debt burden into the policy itself. Even when such
topics enter the debate, they are often couched in terms of  “taxpayer
burden” and the costs incurred by the federal government under the
generic title of  “consumer protections.” Moreover, although, the possible
lack of  clarity and information about debt-accrual is mentioned explicitly
(GAO, 2011a; Kutz, 2011), little concern is given to the possible stigmatiz-
ing effect framing the policy in such a way may have, especially given its
nearly myopic focus on the for-profit sector.
In a related vein, economic theory has also been used to justify the
increased presence of  for-profit higher education intuitions. Market ideals,
typically based on economic theory primarily applicable to the private
sector, are used implicitly to blame individuals for their own financial plight
and serve as the basis for a policy frame of  this type. In a comprehensive
analysis of  for-profit higher education, Bennett et al., (2010, pp. 53-54)
state:
The concept of  consumer sovereignty asserts that the consumer
ultimately determines how a society’s resources will be allocated
based on their decisions of  what to buy and what not to buy.
Profits will only be generated in markets in which the product is in
high demand. Profit creates the incentive for firms to provide more
of  the product, thus automatically drawing resources into produc-
tive activities that satisfy consumers’ wants and needs.
The authors’ statement is correct if, and only if, they assume that price
reflects the marginal benefit of  the service6 to the consumer. They are also
correct if  they assume that the price is market clearing and that no infor-
mation asymmetries exist. However, given the economic structure of  the
higher education sector this is not the case because institutions have much
more information than students and families in the admissions process. In
the context of  underrepresented and socio-economically disadvantaged
students, this is likely a false assumption. The very basis for subsidizing
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higher education is to lower the effective price the student/consumer faces
so as to encourage enrollment (GAO, 2011; Kutz, 2011; Neill, 2009). Thus,
the analysis leaves out what are arguably important characteristics specific
to higher education and in particular to for-profit higher education.
Specifically, that the consumer does not confront the true costs for an
education measured by price in a private market, and as evidenced in the
empirical literature significant information asymmetries exist. In other
words, for-profits can extract higher levels of  tuition and fees because the
student does not fully understand the costs and benefits associated with a
degree from a program. Additionally, this could also be the reason that
students at these institutions employ large amounts of  debt to finance their
degrees. That is, the profit motive of  these institutions can create an
incentive to help students find ways to pay for their education.
Finally, the policy proposal also does not address how it might create
barriers to completion. Students in the middle of  a college career at a for-
profit institution may be forced to withdraw due to what some consider are
arbitrary limits on their ability to obtain debt financing for their college
education (Field, 2010, 2011). In the final rules, the policy is decidedly at
the program level, and as a result student experience and background is all
but left out of  the equation. Therefore, students may be forced to exit a
program without a degree, yet with a large debt burden and fewer pros-
pects for employment, thus effectively limiting future choices.
Overall, the policy frame leaves many normative implications unad-
dressed. While it is unclear whether the policy will have the intended
impact on decreasing student loan defaults, its normative impacts and
implications seem rather clear. First, students from socio-economically
disadvantaged or underrepresented backgrounds who are unfamiliar with
the student aid and college-going process may be vulnerable to marketing
and recruitment practices that promise gainful employment. This promise
however comes at what is clearly a steep cost even with the new rules in
place. A second concern is that by framing the policy as a solely quantita-
tive economic issue, important social justice issues remain largely ignored.
Even with more information, for-profit students may not complete their
degree because of  misunderstandings regarding debt ratios impacting the
institution and its eligibility for federal grants and loans. It is unlikely that
students in this predicament would find relief  in the current policy given
the rhetoric surrounding it, which implicitly places blame for out-of-
control debt and loan defaults on students’ misuse of debt. It also does so
while simultaneously focusing on a specific higher education sector. In the
same way, ED’s decision to ignore what the research literature has shown
to be important indicators of  possible loan-defaults, higher debt-burden
and more unemployment, underscores the policy’s rather narrow focus.
This, therefore, is an important aspect that should be included in the
student aid policy debate and the framing of social problems and potential
solutions.
While this essay has aimed to analyze a specific policy proposal and its
implementation, it became clear that the “gainful employment rule”
intersects many other student aid policy domains and normative issues.
Limitations
of the Essay
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Therefore, some limitations remain. First, questions of  education quality
have largely been left out of  this analysis in order to focus on the specific
policy. Second, the role of  faculty in curricular affairs and governance in
for-profit educational institutions has also been omitted. Third and finally,
the analysis of  distinct markets and competition pressures that exist
between for-profit colleges and universities and non-profit public and
private colleges and universities were also not the focus of  the analysis. It
is important to note that these topics are all related to the current analysis;
however, they must be left to future studies.
The “gainful employment” rule firmly falls within the bounds of  the
current debate on student aid policy as well as social equity. ED has
defined the “gainful employment” rule as a societal problem that was
subsequently framed as an economic issue. In so doing, this essay argues
that the policy has omitted important normative implications that accom-
pany student aid policy and questions of  equity, especially given the rather
robust research literature on the topic. As noted recently in Inside Higher Ed
(K. Gross, 2014; J. Gross & Hillman, 2014), many concerns around student
debt and default remain regarding appropriate metrics, philosophical
positions, public perception, and information asymmetries. These concerns
are not limited to for-profit institutions but somehow, under the gainful
employment rule, have risen to prominence in debates on federal aid
policy.
ED has enacted the policy to ensure that students attending programs in
recognized occupations were in fact being prepared for gainful employ-
ment by primarily for-profit institutions. It did so by establishing a defini-
tion of  gainful employment that essentially, through rules aimed at
diminishing the debt-burden and defaults of students who attend propri-
etary institutions, has specified conditions that would allow an institution
which exceeds certain ratios to be ineligible for federal Title IV funds.
However, ED has also left out an important normative aspect of  the
policy: that students from under-privileged and under-represented back-
grounds tend to disproportionately bear the burden of  student loan
defaults in the for-profit sector. The policy neglects at least three related
normative concerns. First, in its focus on the policy issue as an economic
one it does not take into account the nature of  individual circumstances.
Second, it fails to address concerns with the possible stigmatization of
disadvantaged students attending for-profit institutions by employing such
a frame and limiting the rules primarily to this sector. Finally, it does not
consider how, due to emphasis at the institutional level, it may create
completion barriers for students at institutions that reach the debt-limit
imposed by the “gainful-employment” rule.
Finally, while the spirit of  the policy appears to be defining what gainful
employment should entail after graduation, its economic definition and
emphasis on consumer protections framed as taxpayer burden remove
what are essentially normative concerns of  equity, access, and social justice.
This is not to suggest that economic evaluation and quantitative measures
are not useful, but rather that normative implications should also be
considered. This is especially the case with a policy that is clearly aimed at a
Conclusions
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specific sector, and arguably at students within that sector. With the
omission of  normative implications reemerges the concern that rational
and scientific approaches that remove or bracket important normative
aspects of  the policy process and analysis may omit important social
aspects that affect and inform the way in which policy is formulated,
implemented, and subsequently understood and perceived.
Nexus: Connecting Research to Practice
 For-profit institutions provide a service to students who may
find it difficult, if  not impossible, to access higher education
otherwise. However, little attention was paid to the normative
implications surrounding gainful employment, its framing, and
its image for students attending for-profit institutions. Practitio-
ners should be mindful of  how policies frame particular sectors
of  higher education and the potential effects of  such framing on
student perceptions.
 The normative implications considered here are not specific to
the gainful employment rule. Practitioners should be mindful of
the underlying beliefs and assumptions embedded in policies.
 Because the policy does not take into account the nature of
individual circumstances it does not consider how, due to
emphasis at the institutional level, it may create completion
barriers for students at institutions that reach the debt-limit
imposed by the “gainful-employment” rule. Practitioners at
institutions will likely be challenged to find innovative ways to
help individual students achieve successful outcomes if  debt-
limits are reached.
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Endnotes
1 As noted by Rein and Schoen “framing is a way of  selecting, organizing, inter-
preting, and making sense of  a complex reality to provide guideposts for knowing,
analyzing, persuading and acting. A frame is a perspective from which an amor-
phous, ill-defined, problematic situation can be made sense of  and acted on”
(1993, p. 146). This is closely related to Baumgartner & Jones definition of  image:
“This process is the interaction of  beliefs and values concerning a particular
policy… with the existing set of  political institutions-the venues of  policy action”
(1991, p. 1045) which in turn can be positive or negative.
2 Given the controversial nature of  the policy highlighted in this article, it is
important to state that the author has no affiliation or bias with or toward the for-
profit industry financially or otherwise. The author’s only affiliation in any higher
education sector is to a public university as an assistant professor and research
institute affiliate.
3 Socio-economically disadvantaged means those students who are from families
with below-average incomes.
4 Underrepresented in this case encompasses a wide range of  minority students
including those from African-American, Hispanic/Latino, Native American
backgrounds, and women and non-traditional students.
5 For example, although Dunn and Birkland both speak to the normative aspects
of  the policy process and analysis, the methods they cover and offer as “off-the-
shelf ” are certainly geared more toward quantitative methods and data elements
related to positive analysis.
6 The use of  “service” here is obviously an assumption that higher education and
its outputs (degrees) have become commoditized.
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